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Abstract
Citizenship education is a complex matter, not least when the place of civic virtues in it is consider-
ed. This is illustrated by a consideration of the civic virtue of gratitude. Two conceptions of grati¬
tude are explored. Gratitude seen as a debt is examined and Kant's exposition of it, including his
objections to a person's getting himself into the position where he has to show gratitude as a ben-
eficiary, is explored. An alternative conception of gratitude as recognition is developed. This, it is
claimed, has more relevance to the kind of gratitude it would be appropriate for Citizens of a dem¬
ocratie State to feel and show. The educational implications of these views are briefly indicated.
Gratitude does not have much place in contemporary discussions of the moral
life or moral education.1 Yet we think it right that people should feel gratitude
in all kinds of situations and parents try to encourage such feelings in their chil¬
dren. Is it absent from contemporary ethical and educational discussion because
it is an easily understood notion, easily acted upon? But that seems not to be so.
It often seems to have an uneasy place in everyday life, creating disturbing situa¬
tions. People sometimes do not feel gratitude when others - or even they them¬
selves - think they should, or, even if they feel grateful, they may find it hard to
express their feelings appropriately. Those to whom gratitude is expressed may
often be embarrassed and try in some way to make light of their role in the
benefit offered. These difficulties may be linked with the fact that gratitude
seems in many cases to be something the relatively powerless are expected to
offer to the relatively powerful - children to parents, elderly and infirm parents
to adult children, the poor to the well-off, traditional wives to husbands. It may
be that the reason lies in the ethos of a kind of Gradgrind culture.
"It was a fundamental principle of the Gradgrind philosophy that everything was to be paid for.
Nobody was ever on any account to give anybody anything, or render anybody help without
purchase. Gratitude was to be abolished, and the virtues springing from it were not to be. Every
inch of the existence of mankind, from birth to death, was to be a bargain across a counter. And if
we didn't get to Heaven that way, it was not a politico-economical place, and we had no business
there" (Dickens, 1961:283)
In the public arena the idea of gratitude is commonly regarded as even more
awkwardly out of place. The idea that Citizens should be grateful to the State is
1 I would like to thank John White and Ray Elliot for helpful comments on an earlier version of
this paper.A shortened version of this paper is fortheoming in Studies in Philosophy and Educa¬
tion.
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seen as totally inappropriate. Socrates's linking of gratitude and political Obli¬
gation is perhaps seen as fit material for undergraduates to cut their philosophi¬
cal teeth on but of little importance for understanding the obligations of citi¬
zenship today. When gratitude and political Obligation are linked in our
contemporary political context, we are likely to hear strident fascist voices urg-
ing Citizens to be thankful for what the State has done for them and urging them
to greater sacrifices, often of their lives. This seems to accord ill with any concep¬
tion of self-respecting Citizens taking a responsible role in shaping the political
arrangements of their society. Thus gratitude finds no place in discussions of
citizenship education.
I want to explore the place of gratitude in the moral life and to argue that
feelings of gratitude of a certain kind are centrally important to being a Citizen
in a democratie society.
Gratitude as a Debt
It seems to me possible to discern two coneeptions of gratitude at work in the
way we live our lives. On the one hand, and commonly, gratitude is seen as a
debt, as recent philosophical treatments emphasise (see Berger 1975, Simmons
1979, McConnell 1993). On this view, a reeipient of a benefit from a benefactor
should acknowledge the benefit in a fitting way. Given, that is, that certain con¬
ditions obtain. The benefit has to be given voluntarily; if it was given under du-
ress, gratitude is not appropriate. Again if the benefit is a happy by-produet of
something done without the thought of benefiting someone in mind, gratitude is
not due. Neither is it due if the benefactor knew that he was benefiting the
reeipient but undertook the act only because it brought him benefits. In showing
gratitude, then, the reeipient is acknowledging not the benefit in itself but the
benevolence shown by the benefactor. Thus if the benefit was provided under
duress, unwittingly or as a by-produet of a self-interested projeet, gratitude is not
due because the benefit was not provided in Order to help the reeipient.
As Berger (1975, p. 302) puts it, expressions of gratitude are a complex of
beliefs, feelings and attitudes. By showing gratitude we demonstrate our belief
that the donor acted with our interests in mind and that we are appreciative of
the benefit and the other's concern. We also indicate that we have an attitude of
regard for the benefactor, and importantly, that we do not see him simply as an
instrument of our weifare. We see him rather as a fellow member of our moral
Community. Our benefactor has acted out of concern for us and our expression
of gratitude is an acknowledgement of this. As Berger sums it up:
"The donor has shown his valuing of the reeipient; the donee shows the relationship is mutual by
some form of reeiprocation, and each has demonstrated attitudes appropriate to members of a
moral Community." (Berger 1975, p. 302).
More sharply to illuminate the character of gratitude on the debt account, let me
draw attention to several occasions on which people may experience feelings of
gratitude which it cannot accommodate. First, it does not allow for feelings of
gratitude for things which benefit us but where there is no benefactor with our
good in mind. In a mundane case this might be when, for instance, we arrive late
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at the Station and find that the last train has been delayed and is still in the
Station. Or it might be, for those without any belief in a divine benefactor, feel¬
ings of delight at scenes of great natural beauty. Second, it does not allow for
gratitude to people whose motives in benefiting us are not entirely pure where,
for instance, the benefit was the knowing by-product of a self-interested venture.
I may offer a Student a lift in my car to a Conference, for instance, with the
thought of the welcome Company on the long journey. Finally, it does not accom¬
modate the feelings of gratitude which Christabel Bielenberg feit to a bene¬
factor who, it seems right to assume, had no thought of benefiting anyone. In her
book The Past is Myself, Christabel Bielenberg, whose husband was in a con-
centration camp after the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler, describes a visit to
the headquarters of the Sicherheitsdienst in Berlin where she has come to plead
for his life. There she sees a prisoner being ill-treated who himself remains calm
and even courteous in the face of this treatment.
"I looked up into his face as he passed my chair and tried to show him how I feit. I tried to show him
actually how proud, how humbly grateful I was that a human being could behave with such dignity
in such circumstances" (Bielenberg, 1994, p. 231)
After witnessing the horrific treatment of this prisoner Christabel Bielen¬
berg's fear, her dominant emotion to this point, is replaced by fury.
"I dimly realised the depth of gratitude that I owed to the unknown prisoner and even to his
tormentor, for had it not been for them I might have been in very poor shape. Now I knew that I
was no longer afraid... No one knows how they are going to behave in real danger until they are
faced with it. Not to be afraid is just something to be grateful for and, in this case, because of the
things I had seen, another, equally primitive emotion had taken the place of fear." Bielenberg 1994,
p.232).
These cases are of course very different. That the debt account of gratitude can¬
not account for the feelings feit in the cases of the delayed train or the natural
beauty may not be thought to show that it is unacceptably narrow or in some
other way inadequate. Perhaps the feelings here have something in common
with gratitude but, in the absence of a benefactor, they are more appropriately
seen in the first case as a mixture of relief and gladness at unexpected good
fortune and in the second as awe and delight in the face of natural beauty. And
the second case of mixed motives may also not be too much of a problem. Per¬
haps, as Berger allows, in such cases "we owe one another the benefit of the
doubt" (Berger 1975, p. 299). That the case of Christabel Bielenberg cannot
be covered may, however, be rather more significant, as I hope to show.
Kant and Gratitude
I want to continue to round out the picture of the debt account of gratitude and
a further way of doing that is by considering an illuminating objection to grati¬
tude. That is Kant's objection in the Lectures on Ethics (1780). In one way it
seems odd to cite Kant as an objector to gratitude, since in Die Metaphysik der
Sitten he refers to it as a "heilige Pflicht" (Kant 1797/1956, p 592) and ingrati-
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tude as a "verabscheutes" and "empörendes" vice (Kant 1797/1956, p. 597). In
the earlier Lectures on Ethics (of which I have not been able to locate an original
copy, only a translation) however, Kant casts doubt on whether it is ever wise to
put oneself in the position of a beneficiary, if one can possibly avoid it.
"To accept favours and benefits is also a breach of one's duty to oneself. If I accept favours, I
contract debts which I can never repay, for I can never get on equal terms with him who has confer-
red favours upon me; he has stolen a march upon me, and if I do him a favour I am only returning
a quid pro quo; I shall always owe him a debt of gratitude, and who will accept such a debt? For to
be indebted is to be subject to an unending constraint. I must forever be courteous and flattering
towards my benefactor, and if I fail to be so he will very soon make me conscious of my failure; I
may even be forced to using subterfuge so as to avoid meeting him" (Kant, 1780/1979, p. 118-119).
So, out of duty to oneself, one should not put oneself in a position where one is
obliged to show gratitude. Why should that be?
An initial answer, from within the Kantian framework as it were, must be the
wish to avoid the Situation of eternal indebtedness stressed by Kant in the pas¬
sage above and elsewhere in the Lectures on Ethics (e.g. Kant 1780/1979,p. 222).
It seems that even though the beneficiary may repay his benefactor he can never
be "even with him" because the benefactor did a kindness he did not owe.
"For even if I repay my benefactor tenfold, I am still not even with him, because he did me a
kindness which he did not owe. He was the first in the field, and even if I return his gift tenfold I do
so only as repayment. He will always be the one who was the first to show kindness and I can never
be beforehand with him" (Kant 1979, p. 222).
Many commentators find the idea of an eternal undischargeable debt odd but
since Kant mentions it in several places in the Lectures on Ethics and Die Meta¬
physik der Sitten it cannot be dismissed as some kind of anomaly, or a view
rejeeted in the later critical work.
Let us leave aside for the moment the problem of the eternal undischargeable
debt. One reason for avoiding being a beneficiary with a debt of any kind is that
one should avoid the Situation of being in debt. The problem seems to come
from the debt framework. It is not good, generally speaking, to be in debt and
particularly not for an ethical viewpoint in which the value of autonomy is
stressed. The autonomous person needs ideally to be free of pressures which
might interfere with her ability to make clearsighted, reasoned, independent
judgements in the light of the evidence and ethically significant considerations.
Perhaps one's first reaction is to say that being a beneficiary need not interfere
with such judgements in that the beneficiary can resolutely strive to discount
any pressures deriving from her relationship with her benefactor in her ethical
deliberations. There are however, many well documented historical as well as
fictional accounts of beneficiaries with powerful and influential patrons Coming
under intolerable pressures to act in certain ways at the risk of losing their live-
lihood (like, for instance, those enjoying Lady Catherine de Burgh's patronage
in Austen's Pride and Prejudice). Kant's mention of the need to be forever
"courteous and flattering" towards a benefactor suggests that his views are to be
taken against the background of a cultural context of widespread formal and
informal patronage in which there is a settled and, for the most part, socially
approved pattern of behaviour between patrons and beneficiaries. Viewed
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against this background Kant's warnings of the dangers of becoming indebted
are more understandable. There are particular situations, like that of receiving
benefits from a powerful patron, which can pose threats to other ethical values.
Clearly if indebtedness is to be avoided, there is every reason to avoid putting
oneself in a Situation where one has an eternal and undischargeable debt. But
why does one have such a debt? McConnell offers a possible Interpretation of
this curious Situation where I can never "get even" with my benefactor, which
Kant continues to stress in Die Metaphysik der Sitten (Kant 1956, p. 592).
McConnell suggests that since Kant makes clear in that later work that grati¬
tude is a matter of honouring a person for a kindness he has done us (Kant 1956,
p. 591), what is owed to a benefactor, is not ceaseless attempts to benefit him
(which can never even the score!),but continuous moral recognition because he
was first in benevolence. This moral recognition need not be ostentatious but it
will last throughout one's life (McConnell 1993, p. 169).
This account of the repaying of the debt as a matter of continuing honour and
recognition rather than a ceaseless offering of benefits to one's benefactor
seems to capture the spirit of the Kantian view, particularly if we assume that we
are here talking about substantial benefits and not small everyday courtesies,
like giving a neighbour a lift to the railway Station. Also, even if at first the idea
of moral recognition of one's benefactor throughout one's life seems an extreme
response, it makes more sense than setting a time limit to such regard and mir-
rors common responses to benefits, like "I shall never forget this," "I shall always
be grateful for this." But then it makes Kant's Suggestion in the Lectures on
Ethics that one should, if possible, avoid this Situation rather odd. Why should
one avoid an occasion for showing respect to another person?
And indeed in Die Metaphysik der Sitten Kant no longer thinks that a person
should be deterred from becoming a beneficiary by the debt he will incur and
argues:
„Eine empfangene Wohltat nicht wie eine Last, deren man gern überhoben sein möchte (weil der
so Begünstigte gegen seinen Gönner eine Stufe niedriger steht and dies dessen Stolz kränkt), anzu¬
sehen: sondern selbst die Veranlassung dazu als moralische Wohltat aufzunehmen, d. i. als gegebene
Gelegenheit, diese Tugend der Menschenliebe ... zu verbinden." (Kant 1956,p. 593).
Thus, if one is a beneficiary, one can positively welcome this chance to show
respect to others for their kindness.
This shift in Kant's views offers a hint that there may be another way of look-
ing at gratitude outside the debt framework altogether.
An Alternative View of Gratitude
What form might an alternative view of gratitude take? Is it possible perhaps to
take a view of gratitude which might more easily accommodate, for instance,
help and support between friends.
What is needed is an alternative to the Standard debt account in which the
beneficiary is in some sense an inferior partner. Claudia Card (1988) has of¬
fered an account in which the beneficiary is seen as a trustee or guardian.This at
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least offers the possibility of seeing the relationship between benefactor and
beneficiary outside of a debt framework but in the end it raises, I think, more
problems than it solves.2 Such an account needs to retain the elements of a be¬
nefactor and beneficiary and the idea that appropriate feelings should obtain
between them. But then it needs to be appropriately loosened up so that it is
possible to take a more generous attitude towards the motives of the benefactor
and what might count as an appropriate response from the beneficiary.
Let me sketch such an account. First, reciprocation is taken out of the frame¬
work in which it is seen as a repayment or a quid pro quo. It is seen more broadly
as a response. It is a response in which the beneficiary honours and celebrates
the benefactor's goodwill. This in turn makes possible a continuing and even
strengthened relationship with the benefactor. In this way this account high-
lights Berger's emphasis on gratitude as a mutual relationship between mem¬
bers of a moral Community but relaxes the strict idea of something to be repaid
so that the slate is wiped clean. It is also relaxed in such a way that it is appro¬
priate to reciprocate not only when the benefactor has explicitly acted with the
beneficiary's good in mind. This account also allows for situations, as in friend-
ships, in which people like to offer gifts or help and in accepting such help and
recognising the goodwill of the giver the beneficiary is benefiting the giver. And
for this the benefactor too can be grateful, thus creating a beneficent circle of
gratitude.
It might be argued that this alternative account, which in light of its emphasis
on mutual recognition might be termed the recognition account, is really not
very different from the debt account. The elements are basically the same but
just in a somewhat less strict relation to one another. But perhaps that underesti-
mates the importance of the shift which has taken place. The beneficiary is not
now conceived as in debt, with a need to repay that debt if possible, but as the
repository of someone's goodwill and the good things which have flowed to him
or her as a result of another's efforts. This can call forth an appreciative, celebra-
tory attitude towards a benefactor which sets up a beneficent circle of concern.
This is not, I think, a utopian flight of fancy. Our everyday thinking about
benefactors and beneficiaries offers the possibility of such an alternative ac-
2 Claudia Card (1988:210-124) suggests the trustee or guardian metaphor for the benefactor/
beneficiary relationship. Here the benefactor's act can be seen as a matter of entrusting the
beneficiary with a deposit, an act which shows confidence in the beneficiary. If.for instance, I let
you use some valued possession of mine, you can feel that I trust you and value your projects.This way of looking at the relationship emphasises the valuing of the trustee or guardian of the
deposit by the benefactor. If I am the guardian of a deposit I am not in the inferior position
highlighted in Kant's account and, in less extreme forms, in other versions of the debt account.
On the debt account, the main aim of the beneficiary is to discharge the debt and be free of the
Obligation. On the trustee account, on the other hand, there is no question of seeing the debt as
a bürden to be paid off.
The trustee or guardian does, however, as Card (1988:123-4) acknowledges, have ackward-
nesses. First, a minor point of terminology, it sets gratitude within a legal or banking frameworkand is thus unfortunately reminiscent of the debt view. There are, however, more troublesome
Substantive problems with it. One benefits others by accepting deposits or trusts whereas by
accepting help or a favour one is benefited. Similarly, a trustee or guardian is someone to whom
others are grateful, whereas a beneficiary is grateful to others. And yet, perhaps for this reason,the trustee account does bring out the possibility of mutuality in the benefactor/beneficiary
relationship which I have wanted to emphasise.
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count. Given the ultimately educational focus of this paper, it is interesting to
note, for instance, that as children we first learn gratitude as mutual recognition.
"Say ta to grandpa and give him a kiss" is hardly an initiation into moral
bookkeeping. It is coming to understand gratitude as a form of love.
Making more space for the recognition view of gratitude could make for more
flourishing personal lives as well as a more flourishing polity, as I shall try to
show. The shift is away from moral bookkeeping and an attempt to keep in the
black and survive by our own efforts towards a happy appreciation of interde-
pendence.
I do not want to argue, however, that we should try to rid ourselves of the debt
view of gratitude and simply Substitute something like the recognition view.
Matters are rather more comphcated than that. There is a place for each in the
moral life but those places need to be appreciated. The more relaxed recognition
view strengthens mutual bonds in families, between friends and between mem¬
bers of the wider Community. It encourages people to see themselves as cared for
and others as the source of that concern and creates what I have several times
referred to as the beneficent circle of gratitude.
By contrast, the place of the debt view is perhaps captured in an important
objection to this treatment of gratitude thus far. It could be argued that it has
centred on what might be termed everyday gratitude and totally left out of the
picture those acts which call forth a massively grateful response from the bene¬
ficiary. I have concentrated on lifts in cars, gifts and so on and have not taken
account of the gratitude feit and shown in cases where people are saved from
drowning or financial ruin. In those latter instances especially where strangers
are involved (as, let us say, in the drowning case) gratitude will appropriately be
feit as a debt. Someone saved from drowning by a stranger will feel a massive,
not to say Kantian undischargeable, debt of gratitude to their rescuer. The bond
between rescuer and rescued cannot be of the mutual sort because the rescued
person was saved under the aspect of a human being in distress not for herseif
After the rescue the pair have no reason to see one another again. The gratitude
does not reinforce a mutual bond. In a more extended treatment I would like to
consider such cases in depth. I have not done so here because (particularly if
there is anything in my remarks about their lack of mutuality in many instances)
I think the everyday cases of gratitude are more generally significant for the
political and educational claims which are my focus here.
Gratitude and the State
Should Citizens be grateful? And if so, to whom and for what? Discussions of
gratitude and citizenship attempt to use gratitude as a ground of political Obliga¬
tion and most such attempts rely on the debt account (see McConnell 1993,
chapter VI). The general form of the argument is that the State provides many
kinds of benefits for Citizens and Citizens are thus obligated to show their grati¬
tude by supporting the State, specifically obeying its laws, paying taxes and so on.
In the Crito the argument is that the State is responsible for the birth, nurture
and education of Socrates and thus Socrates should not destroy it by flouting
its laws when he thinks they are wrong. The relationship between State and citi-
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zen is in this way like that between parent and child. It has been argued (Kraut
1984,discussed in McConnell, 1993, p. 183-5) that, although this argument can¬
not show that Citizens are obligated to obey the law, it at least suggests that
Citizens should have a special respect for the State and concern for its well-being,
very much as children should for their parents.
Properly to consider this broad line of argument would involve taking up the
many issues raised in this debate. For instance: does the State benefit Citizens?
Are not the goods the State provides actually provided by the Citizens them¬
selves collectively through taxation? Is it appropriate to be grateful for what is
due to one as a right? Can gratitude be owed to institutions rather than people?
And does gratitude to the State oblige one to obey unjust laws? I shall not enter
this debate because it seems to me to rest on the debt account of gratitude which
has only slight relevance to a democratie community. It is set in a framework of
assumptions, more appropriate to a benevolent dietatorship than a democracy,
about a State ruling over Citizens to which they are grateful for benefits and to
which they make recompense through their obedience. Contemporary commen-
tators on this view (e.g. Goldman, Walker, Simmons) are not unaware of this
problem but they tend to react by trying with great sophistication to tweak the
conditions here and there to make them fit the democratie Situation.
I would like to suggest a more radical Solution, namely a move to the recogni¬
tion account of gratitude. In the context of democratie citizenship the recogni¬
tion account fits very well the kind of relationship that should ideally obtain
between Citizens. For in democratie societies, as important as the formal machi-
nery of voting, multi-party Systems and so on are the attitudes which Citizens
have towards one another and in the light of which they live their civic lives. I am
thinking of attitudes like trust, honesty, decency, self-respect and so on in the
particular forms they must take in democratie societies. For, as I have argued
elsewhere (see White, 1996), democratie self-respect is different from the kind
of self-respect which might obtain in an hierarchical society and, similarly, trust
between Citizens and Citizens and their government takes a particular form in
democratie societies. In the same way, the recognition account of gratitude
seems particularly suited to support the flourishing of a democratie polity. As a
Citizen, rather than looking to see whether people are particularly concerned to
benefit me, I appreciate the fact that much that people do does in fact help to
make communal civic life less brutish, pleasanter and more flourishing. My ap-
preciation does not lead me to make any kind of precisely calculated repayment
but it does affect the way I feel about my fellow Citizens and in a broad sense it
influences my relations with them.
To take this kind of attitude to fellow Citizens might not involve a huge shift in
attitudes and values. As the story of Christabel Bielenberg and the prisoner
illustrates, this way of thinking can come naturally in certain situations. It is a
way of looking at the world which is sometimes expressed by immigrants who
are appreciative of the manners and social atmosphere found in their newly
adopted community. It may even be quite a widespread view amongst long-
standing inhabitants of democratie societies but one which, understandably, they
do not feel called upon to express verbally. It may be expressed rather in the
many, varied ways in which they contribute to the shaping of the democratie
polity.
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One might object to this view by pointing to the existence in allegedly dem¬
ocratie societies of people who feel themselves to be outside the polity, ethnic
groups who experience prejudice and hostility, homeless people. They have little
or nothing for which to be grateful to their fellow Citizens and thus are outside
the beneficent circle. I have no wish to refute that. That seems to me an accurate
description of the way things actually are for some people in democratie soci¬
eties but that only underlines the plight of such people in a society which fails to
make good its democratie credentials. Perhaps one criterion of an adequately
democratie society might be the extent of the beneficent circle of gratitude as
recognition. In the old South Africa it was clearly unthinkable. Can it perhaps
now slowly develop there? Can it develop in Bosnia? Can it become more all
encompassing in the UK?
Educational Conclusion
Let me now suggest some pointers for education in the light of these two con-
ceptions of gratitude. If indeed there are something like these two different ways
of looking at gratitude, the debt view and what I have termed the recognition
view, parents and teachers will need to introduce children to these views in prac¬
tice at the appropriate time and place. Later, as part of their development of a
nuanced understanding of ethical matters, children will need to be helped to
reflect on these different notions and their place in our lives. With young chil¬
dren, parents will be laying foundations of the recognition view in the family and
with their children's friends.They will be keen to direct their children's attention
to the concern lying behind the benefit rather than the actual gift offered or help
rendered. They will also help their children to find ways of expressing gratitude
beyond the conventional thank yous so that the child is imaginatively involved
in the relationship with the benefactor.
Expressing gratitude as recognition in school will be very much a matter, as
with other social virtues (see White 1996), of teachers doing this through the
way they and the Organisation of the school treat school students. To whom, and
how does the school ask students to be grateful? Who shows gratitude to school
students?
The school should also be concerned to open children's eyes to the possibility
of a grateful response of a wider kind to other Citizens in the community, and
even beyond it. This is always important but especially so in democratie pluralist
societies. Gratitude as mutual recognition can be restricted in its fullhearted
sense to one's own group and even if gratitude is feit and expressed towards
other groups it may be in some corrupt form, as when people express excessive
gratitude to those whom they regard as inferiors. A major aim of the school's
education for citizenship should be the widening of the beneficent circle of grat¬
itude as mutual recognition.
It might be thought that these remarks should go further and even perhaps
that I should offer something like useful guidelines for schools to follow. Such a
Suggestion, however, seriously underestimates the role of the professional un¬
derstanding, skill and imagination which teachers need to bring to the task of
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citizenship education, if gratitude, or indeed any other civic virtues, are to be
realised in practice.
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